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SHAWE v. ELTING: THE IMPERFECT SALE OF  
TRANSPERFECT GLOBAL, INC. 
SARAH M. SAMAHA 
INTRODUCTION 
In Shawe v. Elting,1 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court 
of Chancery properly exercised its equitable powers under Delaware’s cus-
todian statute when, upon finding the presence of shareholder and director 
deadlock, it appointed a custodian to sell a massively profitable corporation 
to a third party.2  Phillip Shawe and Elizabeth Elting were the co-founders, 
co-CEOs, and the only two directors of TransPerfect Global, Inc.3  The 
closely held corporation was structured such that Shawe and Elting behaved 
as fifty-fifty owners of the company.4  In the absence of a written agreement 
governing the rights of stockholders,5 the personal and business relation-
ships between Shawe and Elting devolved into irresolvable dysfunction, 
and the parties were left with no intra-corporate recourse.6  In the litigation 
that ensued, the Court of Chancery found that the deadlock between Shawe 
and Elting satisfied the threshold requirements of Section 226 of the Dela-
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 1.  157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). 
 2.  Id. at 160. 
 3.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting, 157 
A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). 
 4.  Id. at *6. 
 5.  Id. at *9. 
 6.  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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ware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)7 and appointed a custodian to 
force a sale of the multi-million dollar corporation to a third party, despite 
Shawe’s objections.8  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision, 
holding that the custodian statute’s grant of power was broad enough to au-
thorize the Court of Chancery to issue such a remedy.9 
The Delaware Supreme Court erred in two respects.  First, the court af-
firmed the Court of Chancery’s expansive reasoning with respect to the “ir-
reparable harm” requirement of Section 226(a)(2).10  In doing so, it ignored 
longstanding jurisprudence requiring a demonstration of imminent insol-
vency or loss of revenue to the corporation in question, and instead accept-
ed the Court of Chancery’s proposition that irreparable harm may encom-
pass things like severely diminished employee morale, client skepticism, 
and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions.11  The court focused on 
this erroneous interpretation of irreparable harm expansively, despite the 
fact that custodianship was warranted regardless under Section 226(a)(1).12  
This Note argues that this nonessential dictum seems to have been used to 
illustrate some degree of proportionality between the alleged harm to the 
corporation and the extremity of the remedy ordered.13 
Second, the court improperly affirmed the Court of Chancery’s grant 
of expansive custodial authority.14  Section 226 jurisprudence indicates the 
reluctance with which Delaware courts have ordered the intrusive custodi-
anship remedy, and emphasizes the principle that a custodian’s authority 
should be as narrowly tailored as possible.15  The court accepted a custodial 
sale as the only means of appropriate relief without first implementing via-
ble alternative remedies.16  Further, in holding as it did, the court failed to 
recognize that the language and prior application of Section 226 does not 
provide stockholders with notice that a remedy as drastic as a forced sale of 
their company might occur, absent their consent.17 
                                                          
 7.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (1953).  
 8.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *106. 
 9.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 160 (Del. 2017). 
 10.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 12.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 13.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 14.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 15.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 16.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 17.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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I.  THE CASE 
A.  The Company and the Parties 
In re Shawe & Elting LLC18 concerned TransPerfect Global, Inc. 
(“TransPerfect” or “the Company”), a Delaware corporation specializing in 
translation services, website localization, and litigation support.19  The 
Company’s breadth is global, spanning ninety-two offices in eighty-six cit-
ies worldwide and employing more than 3,500 full-time employees.20  In 
2014, after a period of steadily profitable growth, the Company’s revenue 
exceeded an all-time high of $470 million, and its net income totaled $79.8 
million.21 
Elizabeth Elting and Philip Shawe—formerly engaged to be married—
founded the Company and served as its co-CEOs.22  They also served as the 
only two members of the board of directors.23  Of the Company’s 100 
shares of common stock, Elting owned fifty, Shawe owned forty-nine, and 
Shawe’s mother, Shirley Shawe (“Ms. Shawe”) owned the remaining 
share.24  Shawe treated his mother’s share as his own,25 and the court found 
that Shawe and Elting “behaved functionally at all times relevant to this 
case as if they were 50-50 owners of [the Company].”26  Shawe and Elting 
“never entered into any written agreements governing the operations of the 
Company or their relationship as stockholders, such as a buy/sell agree-
ment.”27  Shawe and Elting led separate service divisions, and their respec-
tive divisions accounted for roughly equal percentages of the company’s 
revenue in 2013 and 2014.28 
                                                          
 18.  No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).  
 19.  Id. at *4.  
 20.  Id.  TransPerfect also maintains a network of more than 10,000 translators, editors, and 
proofreaders working in approximately 170 different languages.  Id.   
 21.  Id. at *10. 
 22.  Id. at *4. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at *4–5.  
 25.  Id. at *5.  The court observed that, in 2014, “[Shawe] held a proxy giving him the ‘full 
and complete power to exercise at any time . . . any and all rights to and/or arising from or con-
nected with’ [his mother’s] share of [the Company].”  Id.  
 26.  Id. at *6.  
 27.  Id. at *9. 
 28.  Id. 
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B.  A Timeline of Events: Tensions, Disagreements, and “Mutual 
Hostaging” 
Tensions between Shawe and Elting began as early as their broken en-
gagement in 1997, five years after they founded the Company in their col-
lege dormitory room.29  When Elting ended her relationship with Shawe, 
Shawe began acting bizarrely—his behavior included crawling under Elt-
ing’s bed and staying there for a period of time, showing up unannounced at 
Elting’s hotel room in Argentina, and inviting himself to Elting’s wedding 
in Jamaica.30  Personal differences bled into Shawe and Elting’s profession-
al relationship, and early disagreements began over things such as the way 
company assets were spent31 and the proposed opening of global satellite 
offices.32  By late 2012, the disagreements between Shawe and Elting esca-
lated into what Shawe described as “mutual hostaging,” a process by which 
“Elting would hold things up that Shawe wanted unless she got certain 
things that she wanted, and vice versa.”33  In November of 2012, for exam-
ple, Elting rejected the proposed acquisition of a company called Rixon—
despite its value to TransPerfect34—when Shawe declined to approve a $10 
million non-tax distribution requested by Elting.35  Further, though “board-
level decisions” historically required the approval of both CEOs, the rela-
tionship between the two deteriorated such that Elting “insisted that routine 
decisions must receive their ‘dual approval.’”36 
The pattern of “mutual hostaging” between the two CEOs continued 
into 2013, at which point there still existed no buy/sell agreement.37  In ear-
                                                          
 29.  Id. at *7.  
 30.  Id. at *7–8 n.12. 
 31.  Id. at *10–11.  Disagreement of this nature occurred in 2011 when Elting learned that 
Shawe spent some of the Company’s American Express membership points on an expensive plane 
ticket for his fiancée without her approval.  Id.  Elting also “became upset when she learned that 
Shawe had submitted raises for certain employees without her approval.”  Id. at *12.   
 32.  Id. at *13–14.  One particularly heated exchange occurred in 2012, when Elting rejected 
Shawe’s proposal to open an office in France because of the area’s employment laws.  Id.  In re-
sponse, Shawe threatened to freeze the Company’s accounts and shut down the Company.  See id. 
at *14 (quoting heated emails from Shawe to Elting).  Ultimately, Elting relented to Shawe’s re-
quest.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at *15.  
 34.  The Company’s head of sales referred to the acquisition as “fantastic” and implored Elt-
ing to “please . . . not derail that one.”  Id. at *16. 
 35.  Id. at *15.  
 36.  Id. at *17–18.  The dual approval requirement resulted in cross-division meddling.  Id. at 
*18.  In other words, Shawe would meddle with the demands that Elting had for her respective 
division (such as raises for certain employees within her umbrella of leadership), and vice versa.  
Id.  
 37.  Id. at *22.  A buy/sell agreement governs shareholder exits in a closely held business by 
“provid[ing] a firm method of liquidating a shareholder’s interest upon appropriate events.”  Kerry 
M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held Business, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 
109, 111 (1991).  
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ly October of 2013, Shawe threatened to terminate Gale Boodram, the 
Company’s payroll manager,38 if she executed a wire transfer to make a dis-
tribution to the Company’s stockholders without his consent—an act en-
dorsed by Elting.39  Elting retaliated by terminating the Company’s Chief 
Operating Officer, who she claimed had interfered with the wire transfer.40  
Subsequently, Elting retained a corporate lawyer to help her communicate 
with Shawe and suggested that Shawe do the same.41  Shawe belittled Elt-
ing’s proposal as “her latest tantrum” and an idea that was “batsh*t cra-
zy.”42  Shawe then terminated the “Company’s real estate broker [of] twen-
ty years”—an “obvious retaliation,” since Elting’s husband was in the 
broker’s employ.43  Countless feuds and another failed compromise later, 
Shawe began to surreptitiously monitor Elting’s private emails.44  Shawe 
repeatedly and secretly entered Elting’s locked office in her absence to dis-
mantle her computer, remove and copy its hard drive, and then reinstall it.45  
He further “arranged to access the hard drive on her office computer re-
motely.”46 
Shawe and Elting’s corporate in-fighting persisted, resulting in dead-
lock over expenses not approved by both parties,47 personal legal represen-
tation,48 and employee hiring and compensation processes.49  One of the 
consequences of such deadlock was the double payment of Elting’s taxes by 
the Company,50 apparently attributable to the fact that “Shawe and Elting 
                                                          
 38.  Shawe repeatedly accused Boodram of showing favoritism to Elting and viewed her as 
“Elting’s ‘puppet.’”  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *24, *29. 
 39.  Id. at *30.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at *31. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at *40. 
 45.  Id. at *40–41.  
 46.  Id. at *41.  Through Shawe’s “stealthy actions,” he accessed approximately 19,000 of 
Elting’s emails, including approximately 12,000 privileged communications with her personal 
counsel in this litigation.  Id. at *42. 
 47.  See id. at *44–45 (explaining that Shawe refused to participate in the Company’s “true-
up process,” a process by which (1) all unagreed-upon expenses incurred by both CEOs were tal-
lied and (2) proportional distributions in the form of additional compensation were made to each 
party).  
 48.  See id. at *47–48 (explaining that Shawe retained the Company’s outside counsel “to rep-
resent him personally in his dispute with Elting” while “incredibly claim[ing] not to see any con-
flict”).   
 49.  See id. at *51–53 (explaining that Shawe (1) unilaterally hired a senior executive into one 
of Elting’s divisions despite Elting’s objections and (2) authorized a finance manager to provide 
certain employee raises without obtaining Elting’s approval).  
 50.  TransPerfect was reorganized in 2007 as a Subchapter S corporation.  Id. at *8.  Instead 
of paying federal income taxes, Subchapter S corporations’ income or losses “are divided among 
and passed through to its stockholders in proportion to their holdings.”  Id.  Stockholders must 
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were incapable of behaving rationally.”51  Another consequence was the 
termination of the Company’s relationship with its public relations firm—a 
replacement for which Shawe and Elting were subsequently unable to agree 
upon.52  Finally, in May of 2014, the Shawe-Elting feud culminated in four 
separate lawsuits which they filed against each other.53 
C.  Brief Procedural History 
On May 23, 2014, Elting petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery 
to (1) appoint a custodian to sell the Company under Section 226(a)(2) of 
the DGCL54 or (2) equitably dissolve the Company.55  Several months later, 
pursuant to Section 211 of the DGCL,56 Elting filed an action to compel the 
Company to hold an annual stockholder’s meeting (“the Section 211 Ac-
tion”).57  To resolve the Section 211 Action, the parties58 “stipulated that 
they were deadlocked on electing directors.”59  Subsequently, Elting filed 
another action under Section 226(a)(1) of the Delaware Code,60 seeking 
“the appointment of a custodian or receiver to act in the best interests of 
[the Company] given the stipulated deadlock among the Company’s stock-
holders over the election of directors.”61  After a six-day trial in February of 
2015, the Court of Chancery appointed a corporate attorney as a mediator to 
negotiate a resolution between the two parties.62  Shawe and Elting were 
                                                          
then report the income or loss on their personal income tax returns and are compensated by the 
corporation with pro rata tax distributions.  Id.   
 51.  Id. at *55. 
 52.  Id. at *56. 
 53.  Id. at *56–57. 
 54.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1953) (“The Court of Chancery, upon applica-
tion of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians . . . of and for any corpo-
ration when . . . [t]he business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable inju-
ry because the directors are so divided respecting the management of the affairs of the corporation 
that the required vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained and the stockholders 
are unable to terminate this division . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 55.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *57.  
 56.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1953) (“If there be a failure to hold the annual 
meeting [of stockholders] . . . the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held 
upon the application of any stockholder or director.”).   
 57.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *73.  
 58.  The parties are defined as Elting, Shawe, and Ms. Shawe, who was firmly aligned with 
her son.  Id. at *2, *73–74.  
 59.  Id. at *73.  
 60.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1) (1953) (“The Court of Chancery, upon applica-
tion of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians . . . of and for any corpo-
ration when[, a]t any meeting held for the election of directors the stockholders are so divided that 
they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired 
upon qualification of their successors . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part III.A.1.  
 61.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *74–75.  
 62.  Id. at *79. 
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given until June 30, 2015 to resolve their differences under the mediator’s 
supervision,63 but were unable to reach an agreement by that date.64 
D.  The Court of Chancery’s Reasoning and Holding 
The Court of Chancery ultimately held that the appointment of a cus-
todian to oversee a judicially ordered sale of the Company was warranted 
both under Sections 226(a)(1) and 226(a)(2).65 
The Court of Chancery observed that the requirements of 226(a)(1)—a 
provision which does not require a showing of irreparable injury—were 
plainly met.66  The court reasoned that, since the stockholders of TransPer-
fect expressly stipulated to deadlock and an inability to elect successor di-
rectors,67 the 226(a)(1) mandate was satisfied.68  Though the fulfillment of 
the 226(a)(1) mandate is enough to authorize the court to exercise its discre-
tion and appoint a custodian, Chancellor Bouchard continued his inquiry 
under 226(a)(2).69  He observed that Section 226(a)(2) carries three condi-
tions that must be satisfied before the Court of Chancery may exercise its 
authority under the statute.70  First, the directors must be deadlocked.71  
Second, the corporation’s business must either be suffering or be threatened 
with irreparable injury because of the deadlock.72  Third, the “circumstances 
must be such that the shareholders are unable by shareholder vote to termi-
nate the division between the directors.”73  The Court of Chancery ultimate-
ly held (1) that Shawe and Elting were “deadlocked on several matters of 
critical importance to the Company” including tax and non-tax distributions 
and the hiring and retention of various employees;74 (2) that irreparable in-
                                                          
 63.  Id. at *79–80.  
 64.  Id. at *80. 
 65.  Id. at *105.  The Court of Chancery also held (1) the equitable dissolution of the Compa-
ny was inappropriate in the circumstances before the court, (2) that Elting was entitled to favora-
ble judgment with respect to each of the claims Shawe asserted against her, and (3) that the LLC 
founded by Shawe and Elting should be dissolved.  Id. at *114–15, *126, *133.  Considering the 
issues on appeal, this Note will not address these holdings.  
 66.  Id. at *82.  
 67.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 68.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *82–83. 
 69.  Id. at *83. 
 70.  Id. at *83–84 (citing Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
599, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984)).  
 71.  Id.  The board of directors must be “so divided respecting the management of the affairs 
of the corporation that the vote required for curative action by the board as a governing body can-
not be obtained.”  Id. at *83–84 (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2).  
 72.  Id. at *84 (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2–3).   
 73.  Id. (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2).  
 74.  Id. at *84, *89, *89 n.285.  
 2018] SHAWE v. ELTING 907 
 
jury75 to a corporation has been found to include “harm to a corporation’s 
reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale”76 and 
that it had occurred to the Company in the form of severely diminished em-
ployee morale, client skepticism, and failure to potentially benefit from 
proposed acquisitions;77 and (3) that the stipulation entered into by the 
stockholders “plainly” demonstrated that they were unable to overcome di-
rector deadlock.78  Thus, all three requirements of 226(a)(2) were met. 
As the court observed, “Even when the requirements of Sections 
226(a)(1) or 226(a)(2) have been satisfied, the appointment of a custodian is 
not mandatory, but is committed to the Court’s discretion.”79  Thus, the 
court was faced with the question of whether the circumstances before it 
truly warranted an exercise of its authority under Section 226(a).80  In an-
swering this question, the court weighed three options.81  The court first re-
jected the option to “decline to appoint a custodian and leave the parties to 
their own devices,” since (1) dysfunctional management was causing the 
Company to suffer and threatened it with irreparable harm, and (2) “to leave 
Elting with no recourse except to sell her 50% interest in the Company” 
would not enable her to sell her stake at a fair price, since no “rational per-
son would want to step into Elting’s shoes to partner with someone willing 
to ‘cause constant pain’ and ‘go the distance’ to get his way.”82  The court 
then rejected the option to appoint a custodian as a third director in a tie-
breaking role, observing that the court would be “enmesh[ed] . . . into mat-
ters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of time.”83  
The final option, which the court ultimately adopted, was to appoint a cus-
todian to sell the company to a third party.84  The court cited two prior in-
stances when the Court of Chancery “appointed custodians to resolve dead-
locks involving profitable corporations and authorized them to conduct a 
                                                          
 75.  See id. at *92–93 (“Irreparable injury exists ‘when a later money damage award would 
involve speculation’ . . . .” (quoting Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1090 (Del. Ch. 
2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005))).  
 76.  Id. at *93 (citing Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356, 358 
(Del. 1998); Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *4 
(Del. Ch. May 25, 2010); Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC, No. 20405-
NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005); Shah v. Shah, No. 904(k), 1986 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986)). 
 77.  Id. at *96–98.  
 78.  Id. at *98. 
 79.  Id. at *99.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.  
 82.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *101–02. 
 83.  Id. at *102. 
 84.  Id. at *102–03. 
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sale of the corporation.”85  The court reasoned that, though the remedy was 
“unusual” and “should be implemented only as a last resort and with ex-
treme caution,” it was appropriate to opt for a custodial sale in this circum-
stance, since “[Shawe and Elting’s] dysfunction must be excised to safe-
guard the Company.”86  Shawe and his mother filed an interlocutory appeal, 
asking the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse and to consider “less drastic 
measures.”87 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As a general matter, Section 226(a) of the DGCL allows the Court of 
Chancery to appoint a custodian in any one of three scenarios: stockholder 
deadlock,88 director deadlock,89 or the abandonment of corporate business.90  
This Part will first lay out the threshold requirements of Sections 226(a)(1) 
and 226(a)(2), both of which Elting used as grounds for relief.91  It will then 
explain the discretionary nature of a custodial appointment under Section 
226(b), and will demonstrate the level of authority the Court of Chancery 
has previously vested in Section 226 custodians.92 
A.  The Threshold Requirements of Sections 226(a)(1) and 226(a)(2) 
1.  Section 226(a)(1): The Stockholder Deadlock Scenario 
Section 226(a)(1) provides that the Court of Chancery may appoint a 
custodian when, “[a]t any meeting held for the election of directors[,] the 
stockholders are so divided that they have failed to elect successors to direc-
tors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon qualification of 
their successors.”93  Unlike Section 226(a)(2), Section  226(a)(1) does not 
require a showing of actual or threatened irreparable corporate harm.94  Sec-
                                                          
 85.  Id. at *102 (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Fulk v. 
Wash. Serv. Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002)).  
 86.  Id. at *102–103.  
 87.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 154–55 (Del. 2017). 
 88.  See discussion infra Part II.A.1.  
 89.  See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 90.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(3) (1953) (providing that the Court of Chancery may 
appoint a custodian when “[t]he corporation has abandoned its business and has failed within a 
reasonable time to take steps to dissolve, liquidate, or distribute its assets”).  For purposes of this 
Note, the requirements and applications of Section 226(a)(3) will not be addressed, since the peti-
tioner in Shawe v. Elting made no claim for relief thereunder.  
 91.  See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 92.  See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 93.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1) (1953). 
 94.  See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982) (“Specifically, § 226(a)(1) 
requires no additional showing such as irreparable harm to the stockholder or the corporation.”).  
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tion 226(a)(1) requires only a demonstration of a stockholder division re-
sulting in failure to elect successor directors—it contains “no other condi-
tion or exception, expressed or implied.”95  Thus, a Section 226 custodial 
appointment is more easily pursued under 226(a)(1), since a claim thereun-
der is subject to fewer statutory prerequisites.96 
2.  Section 226(a)(2): The Director Deadlock Scenario 
Section 226(a)(2) provides that the Court of Chancery may appoint a 
custodian when directors have reached a decision-making impasse that 
threatens the business of the corporation with irreparable injury and when 
such an impasse is incurable by way of shareholder vote.97  This subsection 
has three distinct requirements: (1) “the business of the corporation must 
either be suffering or be threatened with irreparable injury,” (2) “the cause 
of the business malady must stem directly from the fact that the directors 
are so divided respecting the management of the corporation’s affairs that 
the vote required for curative action by the board as a governing body can-
not be obtained,” and (3) “circumstances must be such that the shareholders 
are unable by shareholder vote to terminate the division between the direc-
tors.”98 
Delaware’s Section 226 jurisprudence indicates that irreparable harm 
exists where the corporation in question is threatened with insolvency or 
loss of revenue.99  In Hoban v. Dardanella Electric Corp.,100 the Court of 
Chancery found that irreparable harm existed where director deadlock was 
such that it prevented a change in the corporation’s bank which would: (1) 
extend the company’s line of credit by $1.1 million, (2) reduce its interest 
expense by $100,000, and (3) prevent the company from “go[ing] under.”101  
Similarly, in Kleinberg v. Aharon,102 the Court of Chancery found that a 
corporation suffered irreparable harm where its directors’ deadlock de-
                                                          
 95.  Id.  
 96.  See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *10–12 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 10, 2009) (finding that the claimant was unable to offer proof sufficient to support a finding 
of threatened or present irreparable harm under 226(a)(2) but was able to “clearly demonstrate[] 
that the limited statutory prerequisite” of 226(a)(1) had been satisfied); see also Bentas v. 
Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000) (granting custodial relief under 226(a)(1) but not-
ing that the stockholder division before the court had not affected the economic well-being of the 
still solvent and profitable company).  
 97.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1953).  
 98.  Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. 
June 12, 1984); see also Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *32–
33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017) (listing Section 226(a)(2)’s requirements as laid out in Hoban).  
 99.  See infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text.  
 100.  No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984).   
 101.  Id. at *4–7. 
 102.  No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017). 
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prived it of the opportunity to benefit from a business venture with another 
company that credibly seemed to be its “only hope” and caused its only re-
maining commercial relationship to disintegrate.103  The court noted that, 
unless the deadlock came to an end, “the [c]ompany ha[d] no chance of pur-
suing a new business plan and w[ould] become irretrievably insolvent.”104 
Conversely, mere inconvenience to the company and its affairs is in-
sufficient to establish irreparable harm.105  In Miller v. Miller,106 the Court 
of Chancery found that the purported deadlock between the sibling-owners 
of two separate youth camps operating as one company amounted to noth-
ing but an inconvenience, because the business was still profitable and still 
operated “reasonably well.”107  The separate camps served as separate profit 
centers for each of the brothers allowing for a reasonable division of income 
between them, and camp managers were able to navigate logistical prob-
lems such that the daily and efficient operation of the camps remained unaf-
fected.108  In emphasizing the profitability of the camps, the court held that 
no irreparable harm existed.109 
The second and third elements of 226(a)(2)—“that the directors must 
be, in fact, deadlocked”110 and that the shareholders “must be ‘unable to 
vote to terminate’” such deadlock by way of shareholder vote’”111—usually 
go hand-in-hand and are present most commonly in the context of closely 
held private corporations.112  For example, the dispute in Hoban involved a 
company with two equally situated shareholders, Hoban and Rensberger, 
who doubled as the company’s only two directors.113  When Hoban pro-
posed a purportedly essential bank transition,114 Rensberger refused to give 
his approval unless Hoban, inter alia, resigned as CEO, thus creating an 
impasse.115  Because of the dual nature of their roles, the director deadlock 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at *17–18, *24–26, *35, *37.  
 104.  Id. at *39.  
 105.  See infra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.  
 106.  No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009). 
 107.  Id. at *9. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at *9–10. 
 110.  Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *32 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
13, 2017) (citing In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 
10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. 
Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017)).  
 111.  Id. at *32–33 (quoting Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
599, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984)).   
 112.  See infra notes 113–121 and accompanying text. 
 113.  Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
June 12, 1984). 
 114.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 115.  Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *5–6. 
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was incurable by way of a shareholder vote,116 and—having found a threat 
of irreparable harm to be present117—the court appointed a custodian under 
226(a)(2).118  Similarly, the company involved in Miller was owned and 
managed by two brothers, each holding fifty percent of its stock.119  Due to 
mounting tensions and a failure to elect directors for more than five years, 
the two siblings were held over as the company’s only two directors, 
“thereby preserving an even split . . . consistent with the equal ownership 
interests.”120  The deadlock in Miller, therefore, could not have been cured 
by shareholder vote.121 
Importantly, Section 226(a) provides that the Court of Chancery “may 
appoint” a custodian where its statutory prerequisites are met.122  This lan-
guage has been interpreted as conferring broad judicial discretion—thus, 
even where 226(a) has been satisfied, the court is not compelled to provide 
the custodianship remedy.123  Delaware courts have traditionally demon-
strated reluctance in ordering the “intrusive” custodianship remedy,124 since 
“such relief constitutes a radical step that ought not to be granted unless the 
plaintiff has rather plainly shown his entitlement to it.”125 
                                                          
 116.  See id. at *7 (“Since the two directors are each a 50 per cent shareholder of the corpora-
tion, it follows that the division of the board which threatens irreparable injury to [the company] 
cannot be cured by action of the shareholders.”).  
 117.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 118.  Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *7.  
 119.  Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 
2009). 
 120.  Id. at *7.  
 121.  Id.  Despite the presence of director deadlock, the court in Miller observed that the corpo-
ration was not threatened with irreparable harm as required by 226(a)(2).  Id. at *9.  Thus, the 
court granted custodial relief under Section 226(a)(1), since there was “an undisputed showing of 
utter disagreement between the two 50% stockholder factions on a number of serious issues.”  Id. 
at *11–12.  
 122.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (1953) (emphasis added).  
 123.  See Miller, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *13 n.15 (“Significantly, the Court ‘may’ appoint 
a custodian if the conditions of 8 Del. C. § 226 are satisfied; it is not mandatory.”); see also 
Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017) 
(“The decision to appoint a custodian is a matter of the court’s discretion.” (quoting 1 EDWARD P. 
WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 226.01, at 7-308 (6th 
ed 2015))).  
 124.  See Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. Ch. 2000) (explaining defendants’ argu-
ment that “the intrusive custodianship remedy ought not to be granted, especially for an economi-
cally successful corporation . . . , unless the record clearly shows that it is necessary and there is 
no better alternative”).  
 125.  Giancarlo v. OG Corp., No. 10669, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. June 23, 
1989); see, e.g., Bentas v. Haseotes, No. 17223, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *15–17 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 5, 1999) (declining to appoint a custodian in the first instance and instead ordering a share-
holders’ meeting which, in the court’s opinion, had the potential to end the shareholder deadlock 
in dispute).   
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B.  A Discretionary Exercise: The Scope of Custodial Authority 
Previously Granted by the Court of Chancery Under Section 226(b) 
Section 226(b) vests the Court of Chancery with considerable authori-
ty in fashioning the powers of an appointed custodian.126  Still, once the 
custodianship remedy has been ordered, “[t]he involvement of the Court of 
Chancery and its custodian in the corporation’s business and affairs should 
be kept to a minimum and should be exercised only insofar as the goals of 
fairness and justice . . . require.”127  As the court in Bentas v. Haseotes128 
opined, the risk that the custodianship remedy would be unnecessarily in-
trusive vis-à-vis the board’s management of the corporation is mitigated by 
specifically defining the custodian’s role and the parameters of his or her 
authority.129  A custodian’s authority “should be tailored as narrowly as 
possible because judicially-supervised interference with the ordinary opera-
tion of a corporation should be kept to a minimum.”130 
In Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.,131 when the plaintiffs’ petition for the 
appointment of a custodian was originally denied by the Court of Chancery, 
the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to appoint 
a custodian vested with “sharply limited” powers.132  The impartial133 cus-
todian was to be given the authority to act only when “the board of direc-
tors . . . failed to reach a unanimous decision on any issue properly before 
them.”134  The custodian’s “tie-breaker” decision in these instances would 
be binding on the corporation and its agents.135  It was left to the Court of 
Chancery to determine how long the custodian would preside, unless or un-
til all of the company’s shareholders unanimously requested the custodian’s 
discharge.136 
Further, in Miller, the Court of Chancery appointed a custodian for a 
two-year term with limited authority.137  The custodian was vested with the 
power: 
                                                          
 126.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b) (1953) (defining the scope of the appointed custodi-
an’s authority “except when the Court shall otherwise order” (emphasis added)).  
 127.  Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).   
 128.  769 A.2d 70 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
 129.  Id. at 78. 
 130.  Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 
2009). 
 131.  449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982).  
 132.  Id. at 240.  
 133.  See id. at 240 n.15 (stating that the custodian should not be a stockholder or creditor of 
the corporation or of any of its subsidiaries or affiliates).  
 134.  Id. at 240. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 
2009).  
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(1) to break material deadlocks between directors; (2) to resolve 
operational deadlocks between the two camps; (3) to participate 
with the power of a director in the event one of the directors is 
unable to serve, with such action duly to reflect the interest of the 
director for whom the custodian is substituting; and (4) to seek to 
resolve the impasse over the future of the Company.138 
The custodian would serve a “tie-breaking” role similar to that of the 
custodian in Giuricich,139 with additional mediation powers—however, “no 
authority [was] conferred upon the custodian[] to sell or divide the Compa-
ny’s real property.”140  Despite its holding, the Court of Chancery nonethe-
less invited counsel on both sides to confer and to jointly propose different 
scopes of custodial authority for its consideration and to suggest an individ-
ual to serve as the company’s custodian.141 
Even in Bentas, where the Court of Chancery vested rather broad pow-
er in the custodian to “explore any and all alternatives that might result in a 
mutually agreed solution to the current shareholder deadlock,”142 it express-
ly declined to prescribe the method through which the custodian would seek 
to end the deadlock.143  The court agreed with the plaintiffs that to do so 
would be “premature and could truncate the parties’ ability to explore addi-
tional solutions that may lead to an agreed resolution of their differ-
ences.”144  In its reasoning, the court refused to consider the defendants’ 
proposal that the custodian “be directed and empowered to sell the Compa-
ny to a third party.”145  Additionally, while the custodian would have the au-
thority to cast a tie-breaking vote, the custodian would only be able to do so 
“in disputes that the custodian deem[ed] to be significant to managing the 
corporation’s business and affairs”—not on every issue with regard to 
which the board is equally divided.146 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Shawe v. Elting,147 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery’s order, holding that the court’s decision to appoint 
                                                          
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.  
 140.  Miller, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *19 n.21. 
 141.  Id. at *19.  This joint proposal would be submitted by counsel as “a form of order to im-
plement [the court’s] letter opinion.”  Id.   
 142.  Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 80 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. at 79. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).  
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a custodian to sell the Company was statutorily permissible and was not an 
abuse of discretion, since the court reasonably concluded that other less in-
trusive measures to resolve director deadlock would be ineffective.148  On 
appeal, Shawe made three arguments: (1) that the court exceeded its statuto-
ry authority under Section 226 when it ordered the custodian to sell a sol-
vent company;149 (2) that, even if the statutory authority existed to empower 
the custodian to sell the Company, the court should have pursued other 
means to address the deadlock before resorting to a sale;150 and (3) that the 
United States and Delaware Constitutions do not authorize the court to or-
der the custodian to sell the Company over stockholders’ objections.151  In a 
split en banc decision, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected all three of 
these arguments.152  Dissenting from the majority decision of her four col-
leagues, Justice Valihura argued that the sale of the Company absent stock-
holder consent was too drastic a measure in light of applicable case law, 
stockholder property rights, and due process protections.153 
On appeal, Shawe did not contest the Court of Chancery’s ruling that 
the requirements of Section 226(a)(1) were met154—instead, he challenged 
the appointment of a custodian under Section 226(a)(2), claiming that the 
court incorrectly applied the standard for irreparable injury.155  The court 
labeled this argument “academic,” since the custodial appointment was 
statutorily warranted under 226(a)(1) regardless.156  Still, the court observed 
that the Court of Chancery correctly applied the threatened or actual irrepa-
rable injury requirement of 226(a)(2).157  It reasoned that, were deadlock to 
persist, “the Company was likely to continue on the path of plummeting 
employee morale, key employee departures, customer uncertainty, damage 
to the Company’s public reputation and goodwill, and fundamental inability 
to grow the Company through acquisitions.”158 
                                                          
 148.  Id. at 160, 166–67. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 162. 
 151.  Id at 168.  The court dismissed this constitutional argument and refused to consider it on 
the merits, since it was raised for the first time on appeal and was not “fairly presented to the trial 
court.”  Id. (citing DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8).  This Note will not address the constitutional argument.  
 152.  Id. at 162–63, 166, 169. 
 153.  Id. at 169–88 (Valihura, J., dissenting).  
 154.  Id. at 161 (majority opinion); see id. (explaining that Shawe could not have challenged 
the Court of Chancery’s ruling with respect to 226(a)(1), since Shawe and Elting “stipulated to the 
stockholder deadlock required by the statute”).  
 155.  Id.  
 156.  See id. (“[T]he argument is academic because Shawe agreed that the Court of Chancery 
was authorized to appoint a custodian under § 226(a)(1).”).  
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 162.  
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Shawe also argued that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in 
that it did not sufficiently consider less intrusive measures before it ap-
pointed a custodian to sell the Company.159  The Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected this argument based on its observation that the Court of Chancery 
made two attempts at developing a remedy less extreme than a company 
sale: (1) it appointed a custodian immediately post-trial to mediate the dis-
pute between Shawe and Elting, which failed to resolve the deadlock,160 and 
(2) it weighed the option of appointing a custodian as a third director who 
would serve as a “tie-breaker,” and then reasonably rejected it on the 
grounds that the court would have to “exercise essentially perpetual over-
sight over the internal affairs of the Company,” something it was not will-
ing to undertake.161  The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately observed that 
“[t]he Chancellor was in the best position to assess the viability of options 
short of sale.”162  Further, the court pointed to several cases “confirm[ing] 
the Court of Chancery’s broad authority under the statute, which includes 
ordering a sale.”163 
In her dissent, Justice Valihura pointed to two main principles under-
mining the majority’s decision.164  First, the DGCL treats stock as personal 
property, which is “generally subject to traditional property law policies fa-
voring free alienation.”165  In her analysis of the DGCL statutory scheme, 
Justice Valihura concluded that stockholders’ personal property rights are 
not meant to be abridged by mere implication—rather, where the DGCL re-
stricts the free transferability or alienability of stock, “it does so express-
ly.”166  Because Section 226 fails to provide express fair notice to stock-
                                                          
 159.  Id. at 166. 
 160.  Id. at 166–67. 
 161.  Id at 167 (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-
CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *102 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. 
Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017)); see id. (“[T]he appointment of a custodian to act as a 
constant monitor and tie-breaker . . . would itself be expensive, cumbersome, and very intru-
sive.”).  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 163 & n.36 (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Bentas 
v. Haseotes, No. 17223, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2003); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. 
Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); In re Supreme Oil 
Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 319 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Brown v. Rosen-
berg, No. 833, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 629 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981)).  
 164.  Id. at 170–71 (Valihura, J., dissenting).  
 165.  Id. at 170.  
 166.  Id. at 173.  Justice Valihura cites several examples, including Section 251 (providing no-
tice to stockholders objecting to a merger that their shares may be subject to divestiture upon mer-
ger majority approval), Section 273 (providing notice to fifty-fifty shareholders that in the pres-
ence of threshold circumstances, their venture may be dissolved despite one shareholder’s 
objection), and Section 303 (allowing a corporation filing for bankruptcy to, inter alia, “make any 
change in its . . . capital stock” or “be dissolved”).  Id. at 173–75 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 251 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1953)).  
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holders that they may be subject to giving up their shares over their objec-
tion, it is unlikely that the Delaware General Assembly intended to permit 
the Court of Chancery to order the whole sale of a company to a third party, 
despite the absence of unanimous shareholder consent.167  The second prin-
ciple proffered by Justice Valihura was that “the involvement of the Court 
of Chancery and court-appointed custodians in a corporation’s business and 
affairs should be kept to a minimum.”168  She explained that the Court of 
Chancery’s past decisions illustrate the concept that the court should intrude 
as little as possible into the business of the corporation.169  She further rea-
soned that stockholder consent to a court-issued remedy is of critical im-
portance—it “softens the blow,” so to speak, and affects the extent to which 
a remedy intrudes upon a corporation’s affairs.170  Absent stockholder con-
sent, there is more intrusion.171  Justice Valihura finally concluded that “the 
sale of the Company, absent stockholder consent, is too drastic a measure, 
and . . . the trial court should [have] consider[ed the] implementation of 
remedies on an incremental basis.”172 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In affirming the Court of Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Supreme 
Court erred in two ways.  First, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s 
incorrect reasoning with respect to the “irreparable harm” requirement of 
Section 226(a)(2).173  It ignored longstanding jurisprudence requiring a 
demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue, and instead ac-
cepted the Court of Chancery’s expansive proposition that irreparable harm 
may be deemed to encompass severely diminished employee morale, client 
skepticism, and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions.174  Second, 
the court improperly affirmed the Court of Chancery’s massive grant of 
custodial authority in that it did not consider less intrusive alternatives and 
ordered a sale despite shareholder objections—an unprecedented judicial 
act.175  The court summarily accepted a custodial sale as the only means of 
appropriate relief, without considering that its equitable power—though 
significantly broad—may have some limit.176 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 173. 
 168.  Id. at 171 (citing Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982)).  
 169.  Id. at 183. 
 170.  Id. at 184.  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id. at 186. 
 173.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 174.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 175.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 176.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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A.  The Delaware Supreme Court Trivialized the Irreparable Harm 
Requirement of Section 226(a)(2) 
Though Shawe and Elting stipulated to deadlock and satisfied the re-
quirements of Section 226(a)(1), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
Court of Chancery’s incorrect reasoning with respect to a custodial ap-
pointment under 226(a)(2) in dicta.177  In doing so, it interpreted the irrepa-
rable harm requirement so as to encompass severely diminished employee 
morale, client skepticism, and failure to benefit from proposed acquisi-
tions—notwithstanding the Company’s profitability to date.178  The court 
noted that, were the deadlock to persist, “the Company was likely to con-
tinue on the path of plummeting employee morale, key employee depar-
tures, customer uncertainty, damage to Company’s public reputation and 
goodwill, and fundamental inability to grow the Company through acquisi-
tions.”179  This, it held, was sufficient to demonstrate threatened and actual 
irreparable harm to the Company.180  Section 226 jurisprudence and general 
principles of irreparable harm, however, suggest that this conclusion was 
flawed. 
The irreparable harm requirement should not be satisfied when the 
corporation is in no way threatened with insolvency or loss of revenue.181  
In Kleinberg, for example, the Court of Chancery found the existence of 
threatened irreparable harm and noted that, unless the deadlock at issue 
came to an end, the company would “ha[ve] no chance of pursuing a new 
business plan and [would] become irretrievably insolvent.”182  Similarly, in 
Hoban, where deadlock amongst directors blocked a purportedly essential 
bank transition without which the company would “go under,” the court 
found that irreparable harm existed, since “[s]ome change in financing ar-
rangements [was] needed promptly if [the company was] to continue in 
business.”183  Conversely, in Miller, the court found that where “[t]he busi-
ness of the corporation . . . [still] operate[d] reasonably well,” irreparable 
                                                          
 177.  Shawe,157 A.3d at 162 (majority opinion).  
 178.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *96–98 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting, 
157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).  
 179.  Shawe, 157 A.3d at 162.  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See infra notes 182–184 and accompanying text. 
 182.  Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *39 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
13, 2017).  
 183.  Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. 
June 12, 1984).  
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harm was not demonstrated—in holding as it did, the court emphasized the 
profitability of the business.184 
In support of its conclusion that irreparable corporate harm may in-
clude “harm to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, 
and employee morale,” the Court of Chancery cited four cases185—all of 
which were insufficiently explained or were readily distinguishable from 
the facts of In re Shawe & Elting LLC.  The first of the cases, Kirpat, Inc. v. 
Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission,186 was cited in a paren-
thetical as “finding irreparable harm where the company would suffer ‘loss 
of its customer base, and loss of its employees.’”187  The company in Kir-
pat, however, would additionally “suffer the seizure of its inventory” and 
would consequently “lose its business” were the court to deny a stay pend-
ing appeal with respect to the revocation of the corporation’s liquor li-
cense.188  Thus, the loss of the Kirpat corporation’s customer base and em-
ployees was less significant, as the seizure of the corporation’s assets 
threatened insolvency and loss of revenue.  The Court of Chancery failed to 
address this aspect of Kirpat and, instead, suggested that a failure to retain 
customers and employees, notwithstanding its effect on the company’s 
profitability, is sufficient to establish irreparable harm. 
The Court of Chancery then cited Arkema, Inc. v. Dow Chemical 
Co.189 as “finding irreparable harm where an imminent threat to the compa-
ny’s goodwill and reputation existed.”190  This parenthetical, too, is lacking 
in holistic factual background.  In Arkema, the corporation’s business—the 
manufacture and sale of products containing a key chemical supplied by the 
defendant191—heavily depended on the company’s reputation for reliabil-
                                                          
 184.  Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 
2009).  
 185.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298  (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting, 
157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (citing Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356, 
358 (Del. 1998); Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010); Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC, No. 
20405-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005); Shah v. Shah, No. 904(k), 
1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986)); see supra note 76.  The Court of 
Chancery provided these four cases, and these four cases only, as support for its above the line 
proposition that irreparable corporate harm may include “harm to a corporation’s reputation, 
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.”  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93.  
 186.  741 A.2d 356 (Del. 1998). 
 187.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Kirpat, 741 
A.2d at 358).  
 188.  Kirpat, 741 A.2d at 358.  
 189.  No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010).  
 190.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Arkema, 2010 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *4).  
 191.  Arkema, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *1. 
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ity.192  This was so because the company’s customers maintained quality 
control programs requiring them to “evaluate the reliability of their suppli-
ers’ supply chain.”193  To that end, the company was required to “compete 
continually to gain and retain its customers” and expressly marketed itself 
as more reliable than its competitors.194  In the Arkema plaintiff’s business, 
“reliability is essential when determining whether or not to choose a suppli-
er,” and harm to the company’s reputation would directly result in the loss 
of “significant amounts of its business.”195  In fact, Arkema submitted sev-
eral affidavits to show, inter alia, that the defendant’s failure to supply the 
plaintiff with the chemical essential to its products would “cause Arkema to 
lose customers and business for an indefinite period going forward.”196  
Thus, contrary to the Court of Chancery’s analysis in In re Shawe & Elting, 
the Arkema decision does not stand for the proposition that damage to a 
company’s reputation, without more, is sufficient to establish actual or 
threatened irreparable harm.  The direct correlation between the company’s 
reputation for reliability and the profitability of its business was of critical 
importance in the Arkema court’s ultimate finding of threatened irreparable 
harm. 
The third case cited by the Court of Chancery was Penn Mart Super-
markets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC,197 which was described as “find-
ing potential lost sales and lost customers sufficient to establish irreparable 
harm.”198  Penn Mart involved two lessees in a shopping center—one oper-
ating a supermarket (“Thriftway”) and the other operating a discount store 
(“NWL”).199  The dispute arose from NWL’s alleged violation of a lease 
covenant precluding it from selling certain perishable products and protect-
ing Thriftway from competition.200  The court found that the threat of irrep-
arable harm existed where NWL’s violation caused Thriftway to suffer “po-
tential lost sales” and “loss of customers,” thus entitling Thriftway to 
limited permanent injunctive relief.201  The finding of irreparable harm in 
Penn Mart is completely consistent with the long-standing principle that ir-
reparable harm can only be said to exist where loss of revenue or a decrease 
in profitability is imminent.  It fails, however, to illustrate the Court of 
                                                          
 192.  Id. at *16. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at *15–16. 
 195.  Id. at *9, *17.  
 196.  Id. at *16 (quoting Douglas Sharp Aff. p.54). 
 197.  No. 20405-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005).  
 198.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Penn Mart, 
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15).  
 199.  2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *1.  
 200.  Id. at *1, *4.  
 201.  Id. at *69, *71. 
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Chancery’s generalized above-the-line proposition that irreparable harm 
may include “harm to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer rela-
tionships, and employee morale.”202  At no point in Penn Mart does the 
court make such a determination. 
The Court of Chancery finally cited Shah v. Shah203 as “finding irrepa-
rable harm when disruptive management conflicts threatened employee re-
tention.”204  In Shah, one of the part-owners of a local motel was accused of 
harassing the business’s employees and interfering with the performance of 
their duties.205  Entered into evidence were the affidavits of several employ-
ees expressing their intent to resign if the disruptive and “harassing” behav-
ior of the part-owner towards them was not restrained.206  Were the ag-
grieved employees to indeed resign, the court in Shah observed that “the 
[partnership’s] operations [would] be severely impaired and may cease en-
tirely,” likely due to the motel’s status as a small, service-oriented busi-
ness.207  The Court of Chancery in In re Shawe & Elting again failed to 
mention that the record in Shah indicated that that irreparable harm in the 
form of a complete business shutdown was imminent, absent court interven-
tion.  Thus, the partnership in Shah was indeed threatened with insolven-
cy—mere lack of employee retention, without more, would have been un-
likely to persuade the Shah court that the motel was threatened with 
irreparable harm. 
The Delaware Supreme Court summarily and incorrectly affirmed the 
Court of Chancery’s reasoning with respect to the irreparable harm re-
quirement of Section 226(a)(2) without examining the sources cited in sup-
port of the Court of Chancery’s expansive proposition.  It concluded that 
“the Court of Chancery properly applied . . . settled principles of irreparable 
injury to evaluate the likelihood of threatened or actual irreparable injury to 
the Company’s business.”208  This conclusion is flawed, since “settled prin-
ciples of irreparable injury” have not traditionally been said to rest solely on 
diminished employee morale, client skepticism, and failure to benefit from 
proposed acquisitions notwithstanding the Company’s profitability to 
date.209 
                                                          
 202.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93.  
 203.  No. 904(k), 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986).  
 204.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Shah, 1986 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2).  
 205.  Shah, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *1. 
 206.  Id. at *2, *6–7. 
 207.  Id. at *7.  
 208.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 161–62 (Del. 2017).   
 209.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *96–98.  
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TransPerfect is a global behemoth that nets millions of dollars in an-
nual income.210  Tensions between Shawe and Elting peaked in 2012, but 
the Company’s revenue two years later in 2014 exceeded an all-time high of 
$470 million.211  Nothing in the record suggests that the Shawe and Elting 
feud jeopardized the Company’s immense profitability, which was recog-
nized expressly by Chancellor Bouchard in his opinion.212  Despite the in-
cessant corporate in-fighting, the Company “experienced profitable growth 
every year for over two decades.”213  In fact, after the Court of Chancery’s 
decision issued, it was reported that the Company’s revenue totaled $546 
million in 2016—an “all-time record.”214  The Company had no debt.215  
Still, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that TransPerfect was threat-
ened with irreparable harm in the form of “harm to [its] reputation, good-
will, customer relationships, and employee morale.”216  In doing so, the 
court missed a significant nuance: the harms it describes are but the means 
by which irreparable corporate harm, as a separate and isolated conse-
quence, ultimately manifests itself.  Harms to a company’s reputation, 
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale are certainly harms 
that could theoretically have an impact on the company’s solvency or prof-
itability; however, absent a grand scheme showing of an imminent and di-
rect impact, they are insufficient of their own right to be deemed irreparable 
in nature.  Incidental, typical, and expected harms that flow from corporate 
dissension should not be deemed sufficient to constitute irreparable harm, 
absent a demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue.  The 
court’s contrary conclusion—though made in dictum—sets a dangerous 
precedent and relaxes the threshold irreparable harm requirement, making it 
significantly easier to meet.  In fact, Vice Chancellor Laster recently cited 
to this dictum in a subsequent decision, suggesting that the In re Shawe & 
Elting LLC court’s proposition has become the new standard of analysis in 
the irreparable harm context.217  Instead of exhausting intra-corporate reme-
                                                          
 210.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 211.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 212.  See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *91 (“It is true the Compa-
ny has been highly profitable.”).  
 213.  Id. at *10 (emphasis added); see id. at *10 tbl.1 (charting the increase in the Company’s 
profitability from 2008 when the Company’s revenue totaled $199.1 million, to 2014 when the 
Company’s revenue totaled $471.3 million).  
 214.  TransPerfect Annual Sales Reach All-Time High in 2016, NASDAQ GLOBAL NEWSWIRE 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/01/17/906384/0/en/TransPerfect-
Annual-Sales-Reach-All-Time-High-in-2016.html.   
 215.  Id.  
 216.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 161 (Del. 2017) (citing In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93).   
 217.  Kleinberg v. Aharon, No.12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *37 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 
2017) (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 
10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015)) (“The necessary harm also can 
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dies and attempting in good faith to resolve conflict outside the courtroom, 
it is likely directors looking to walk away from the business will petition the 
court for a more readily attainable custodianship remedy under Section 
226(a)(2), using incidental effects of corporate dysfunction as the basis for 
their claim to irreparable harm. 
Interestingly, the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court 
both chose to entertain the 226(a)(2) argument even though custodianship 
was appropriate regardless under Section 226(a)(1).218  Why would these 
courts—arguably the most sophisticated corporate tribunals in the coun-
try219—purposefully spend time discussing and validating an argument that 
was nonessential to the outcome of the case?  The answer is simple: propor-
tionality.  The phrase “irreparable harm” carries massive weight in corpo-
rate jurisprudence.  It appears in a multitude of equitable contexts, including 
that of the preliminary injunction,220 that of the temporary restraining or-
der,221 and that of receivership.222  In these circumstances, “irreparable 
harm” is pervasive legal language that signals a potential for injury so 
grievous that immediate equitable court intervention is required as a matter 
of justice.223  The Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court seem 
to have intentionally framed the Shawe-Elting feud as a legally cognizable 
instance of irreparable harm so that a drastic equitable remedy would seem 
more justified.  The courts deliberately weaved the “theme” of irreparable 
                                                          
result from damage to ‘a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee 
morale.’”).  Ultimately, as discussed supra in Part IV.A of this Note, the court in Kleinberg ex-
pressly found that insolvency was indeed imminent—it thus applied the correct irreparable harm 
standard to the facts before it, despite having cited the dictum in In re Shawe & Elting LLC.  See 
supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 218.  See supra notes 69, 156 and accompanying text. 
 219.  See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-
governance/502487/ (“[The Delaware Court of Chancery’s] judges are some of the country’s most 
renowned experts in business law.”).  
 220.  See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 497 (Del. Ch. 2010) (explaining 
that a preliminary injunction may only be granted if plaintiffs demonstrate that they would suffer 
irreparable injury absent relief). 
 221.  See DEL. CH. R. 65(b) (“A temporary restraining order may be granted . . . only if . . . it 
clearly appears from specific facts . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will 
result to the applicant . . . .”). 
 222.  See, e.g., Beal Bank v. Lucks, No. 14896, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at *13 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 23, 1998) (explaining that the discretionary nature of the receivership remedy requires a con-
sideration of the imminence of irreparable loss). 
 223.  See DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE & COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 2.03 (2017) (explaining that “equitable 
jurisdiction may be invoked . . . only if the threat of the injury . . . is shown to be a real and con-
tinuing one”); see also Chateau Apartments Co. v. Wilmington, 391 A.2d 205, 208 (Del. 1978) 
(“For equity to assume jurisdiction . . . the danger to which the plaintiff is exposed must be a real 
one.” (citing JOHN N. POMEROY & SPENCER W. SYMONS POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 251 (5th ed 1995))).  
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harm into the fabric of their decisions to evince some degree of proportion-
ality between the severity of Shawe and Elting’s corporate dissension and 
the extremity of the ordered custodial sale. The courts’ intentional in-depth, 
albeit unnecessary, analysis of Section 226(a)(2)’s irreparable harm re-
quirement—despite its peripheral relevance to the case’s outcome—
persuades the conclusion that the courts may have been aware of how truly 
drastic the unprecedented remedy of an ordered custodial sale really was. 
B.  The Delaware Supreme Court Incorrectly Affirmed the Court of 
Chancery’s Enormous and Unprecedented Grant of Power to the 
Appointed Custodian 
In affirming the Court of Chancery’s decision to appoint a custodian to 
sell the Company to a third party, the Delaware Supreme Court ignored the 
long-standing principle that “[t]he involvement of the Court of Chancery 
and its custodian in the corporation’s business and affairs should be kept to 
a minimum and should be exercised only insofar as the goals of fairness and 
justice . . . require.”224  Section 226 jurisprudence has repeatedly spoken to 
the reluctance with which the Court of Chancery imposes the “intrusive” 
custodianship remedy225 and to the principle that a custodian’s authority 
should be as narrowly tailored as possible.226  The Delaware Supreme Court 
should have reversed and recognized (1) that the Court of Chancery could 
have ordered a variety of less intrusive, incremental alternatives that would 
have kept its decision consistent with the aforementioned two principles, 
and (2) that the Court of Chancery’s equitable power under Section 226 
does not include the authority to order a custodial sale despite shareholder 
objections. 
The court’s decision could have been less intrusive in several ways.  
First, the court could have reversed with instructions to appoint a custodian, 
for a specified period of time, vested with (1) a tie-breaking vote; and (2) 
mediation powers—either as the courts in Giuricich and Miller did, where 
the custodians were vested with the power to break ties on any issue about 
which directors were deadlocked,227 or as the court in Bentas did, where the 
custodian could only break the tie on issues “significant to managing the 
corporation’s business and affairs.”228  This incremental remedy could have 
potentially tempered the animosity between Shawe and Elting, who may 
have been less inclined to act opportunistically knowing that their attempts 
                                                          
 224.  Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).   
 225.  See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 226.  See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.  
 227.  See supra notes 134, 138 and accompanying text.  
 228.  Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 79 (Del. Ch. 2000); see text accompanying supra note 
146. 
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would fail when the impartial third vote was cast.  The Court of Chancery 
summarily rejected this option, however, observing that “it would enmesh 
an outsider and, by extension, the Court into matters of internal corporate 
governance for an extensive period of time.”229  Importantly, in its reason-
ing, the court nowhere considered the appointment of a provisional tie-
breaking custodian with a limited term as a viable “first step” in the corpo-
rate healing process; instead, it fixed its conclusion on the assumption that 
the custodian’s role would be indefinite.   
Second, the court could have affirmed the decision to appoint a custo-
dian, and could have ordered that both Elting and Shawe be given an oppor-
tunity to confer and submit proposals suggesting different scopes of custo-
dial authority—just as the court did in Miller.230  This may have 
incentivized cooperation among the parties whom, at that point, would have 
had to accept that custodianship was imminent and would have been more 
inclined to agree upon the precise corporate role the custodian would come 
to play.  Third, the court could have forced a buy-out through a sealed bid 
process whereby either Shawe or Elting would have been given time to se-
cure financing and would have been given the option to bid on the Compa-
ny.  A forced buy-out would have resolved the deadlock while simultane-
ously giving Shawe or Elting a chance to maintain ownership of the dorm 
room start-up that they built into a multi-million-dollar global giant. 
Instead of implementing a less intrusive, incremental remedy in the 
first instance and reassessing its ruling in the event of further dispute or 
continued deadlock, the court accepted a one fell swoop excision in the 
form of a custodial sale as an appropriate remedy to eliminate the likelihood 
that dispute would recur altogether.  In ruling as it did, the court essentially 
signaled that shareholders in closely held corporations would be wise to ex-
haust every last option before petitioning the court for relief—shareholders 
should be so deadlocked that they would be willing to risk a whole sale of 
their company.  Though this may seem like a positive result, it may dis-
courage deadlocked directors and shareholders from seeking intra-corporate 
recourse.  For example, if an aggrieved fifty percent shareholder-director in 
a closely held corporation cannot secure her counterpart’s cooperation in 
resolving the deadlock between them and cannot compel such cooperation 
because of the absence of a shareholders agreement, she now has two op-
tions.  She can either (1) remain cemented in her ownership, thus allowing 
the deadlock to persist and thus running the risk of accelerating her compa-
ny’s demise; or (2) petition the court for a Section 226 custodial sale reme-
dy.  The second option gives the aggrieved shareholder an immediate exit—
                                                          
 229.  In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *102 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).  
 230.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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armed with an arsenal of facts detailing her partner’s lack of cooperation 
and opportunistic behavior, she now has the power to skip bona fide negoti-
ation efforts and jump right to the option of equitable judicial intervention. 
And, that intervention may very well manifest itself in the form of a custo-
dial sale—an ideal outcome, in this circumstance. 
Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court misinterpreted the bounds 
of the Court of Chancery’s authority under Section 226, and improperly re-
lied on distinguishable case law.  As Justice Valihura explained in her dis-
sent, there does not exist “a single case in the history of our Section 226 ju-
risprudence where a court has ordered a custodial sale of a company over a 
stockholder’s objections.”231  In support of its proposition that “several 
sources confirm the Court of Chancery’s broad authority under [Section 
226], which includes ordering a sale,” the majority cited several cases,232 all 
of which are distinguishable from Shawe v. Elting in that they involved 
consent by all of the stockholders to a whole sale of the business.  The ma-
jority expressly acknowledged this difference in a footnote, purporting to 
demonstrate the Court of Chancery’s broad equitable discretion even 
though the examples it cited all “involve[d] actions where the parties even-
tually agreed the business should be liquidated or sold.”233  Where stock-
holder consent to a court ordered sale is present, the remedy is significantly 
less intrusive234 and is thus consistent with the long-standing principle that 
the involvement of the Court of Chancery and its custodian should be kept 
to a minimum.235  Absent stockholder consent, however, the court has never 
ordered the sale of a corporation to a third party—it thus erred in doing so 
in this instance.  The Court of Chancery effectively forced divestiture of the 
Shawes’ ownership interests without recognizing that the language and pri-
or application of Section 226 failed to provide them with sufficient notice 
that a remedy as drastic as a whole sale of their company may occur.236  As 
Justice Valihura pointed out in her dissent, Section 226 fails to provide ex-
press notice to stockholders that they may be subject to giving up their 
                                                          
 231.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 171 (Del. 2017) (Valihura, J., dissenting).  
 232.  Id. at 163–64 n.36 (majority opinion) (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, No. 17223 NC, 2003 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2003); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 319 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Brown v. Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 629 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981)); see supra note 163. 
 233.  Shawe, 157 A.3d at 163–64 n.36 (emphasis added).  Justice Valihura also distinguished 
these cases in her dissent, pointing to the presence of stockholder consent in each.  Id. at 181 (Va-
lihura, J., dissenting).  
 234.  Id. at 183 (Valihura, J., dissenting).  
 235.  Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).   
 236.  See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.  
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shares over their objection;237 it is thus unlikely that the Delaware General 
Assembly intended to permit the Court of Chancery to order the whole sale 
of a company to a third party, despite the absence of unanimous shareholder 
consent.238 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Shawe v. Elting, the Delaware Supreme Court improperly affirmed 
the Court of Chancery’s unprecedented decision to order the custodial sale 
of a deadlocked corporation to a third party, despite stockholder objec-
tions.239  In doing so, the court trivialized the irreparable harm requirement 
of Section 226(a)(2) and declined to holistically review the case law cited 
by the Court of Chancery in support of its proposition that irreparable harm 
may be deemed to encompass damage to “a corporation’s reputation, 
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.”240  The court also 
failed to recognize the unprecedented nature of a custodial sale absent 
stockholder consent and instead made a sweeping determination—without 
due consideration of less intrusive and incremental alternatives—that the 
Court of Chancery correctly concluded that whole sale was the only viable 
way to “excise” Shawe and Elting’s dysfunction.241  In February 2018, the 
Court of Chancery approved a $385 million cash purchase of the Compa-
ny.242  The purchaser was an entity owned and managed exclusively by  
                                                          
 237.  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (1953) (containing no language that would pro-
vide shareholders with notice that their ownership interests may be affected absent their consent), 
with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1953) (providing notice to stockholders objecting to a merger 
that their shares may be subject to divestiture or cancellation upon majority approval); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (1953) (providing notice to fifty-fifty shareholders that in the presence of 
threshold circumstances, their venture may be dissolved despite one shareholder’s objection); and 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1953) (allowing a corporation filing for bankruptcy to, inter alia, 
“make any change in its . . . capital stock” or “be dissolved”).   
 238.  Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 173 (Del. 2017). 
 239.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
 240.  See discussion supra Part IV.A; In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, 
No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015). 
 241.  See discussion supra Part IV. B; In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at 
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 242. See In re TransPerfect Global, Inc., No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, at 33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 
2018).  The Company’s implied aggregate enterprise value was agreed upon and set at $770 mil-
lion at the time of sale.  Id. at 31.  
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none other than Phillip Shawe;243 and like clockwork, Elting filed an appeal con-
testing the sale.244  As one news outlet aptly put it: “The saga of TransPerfect will 







                                                          
 243.  Id.; see Jeff Neiburg, Chancery Court Approves Sale of TransPerfect, DEL. ONLINE, Feb. 
15, 2018, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2018/02/15/chancery-court-
approves-sale-transperfect/341189002/ (summarizing the details of the sale).  
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 245.  Id.  
